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Pnina Lahav

A Small Nation Goes to War:
Israel’s Cabinet Authorization of the
1956 War
Abstr act
The Suez War had long term ramifications for Israel’s status in the Middle
East and for its relations with the U.S., Europe, and the USSR. This article
is a first segment in the examination of the interplay between military and
diplomatic means deployed by Israel in its quest to consolidate the gains
of the 1948 war and secure its sovereignty. It provides a detailed analysis of
the Israeli cabinet deliberations as it reached the decision to authorize war.
The article examines the cabinet’s opinions on the language of the motion
to go to war, the list of casus belli offered, the secret agreement with France
and Britain which precipitated the war, considerations of possible complications, the theory of war and peace, the likelihood of regime change in
Egypt, and the preparedness of the home front. It raises the question of the
relevance of the comparative size and strength of a nation as it ponders the
option of launching a war.

O

BACKGROUND

n 29 October 1956, Israel launched a war against Egypt.
Two days later it became clear that Britain and France were Israel’s senior
partners, and that the central target of the two colonial powers was to
restore their hold over the Suez Canal.1 A fearsome international storm
erupted and the three belligerents quickly abandoned their grand plan and
withdrew their forces. While short and militarily uneventful, the Suez War
is generally considered a watershed event in the history of Middle East. It
signaled the end of the colonial era and the beginning of the transformation
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of the region into a battleground between the U.S. and the USSR; thereby,
the Arab–Israeli conflict intensified in ways hitherto unpredicted. The Suez
War was also etched in the minds of Israel’s decision makers and affected
their decision making a decade later during the Six-Day War and, later,
the Yom Kippur War. Its further significance lies in the fact that this was
the first time Israel’s cabinet approved a war since the establishment of the
state in 1948.
Until recently, the voluminous scholarship on this war did not pay
much attention to the Israeli cabinet deliberations authorizing the war.
The perceived wisdom was that the ministers were privately informed by
PM and Minister of Defense Ben-Gurion, and that the formal process of
authorization was trivial.2 One reason for this assertion was that the cabinet
protocols were classified and inaccessible; however, in 2008, the files were
opened.3
The protocols reveal that even though the cabinet was aware that it
was facing a fait accomplis it still deliberated vigorously and for the most
part honestly and courageously. Ben-Gurion’s confrontation with his cabinet was not easy, and during the deliberations he revealed his anxiety and
foreboding. The protocols also reflect the unhappy condition of an insecure
and dependent junior partner about to embark on a roller coaster. If Israel
declined the French proposal it could have lost the generous support and
cooperation of the French and the prospects of befriending Britain. If it
joined the French plan it could gravely suffer the injuries of war while alienating the U.S., which most emphatically opposed the idea of war. There
was also the temptation to seize an opportunity − join the allies and bring
about a new Middle East order with a weakened Egypt and a stronger Israel.
The protocols are also a testament to the painful historical experience of
an eight-year old fledgling polity struggling to develop democratic features
while experiencing pressures to maintain a centralized style of leadership
in order to face the threats to its security and survival.4
Israeli constitutionalism places the decision to go to war in the hands
of the executive branch. However, the nature of the cabinet as a microcosm
of the majority parties in parliament may provide for a check on the prime
minister and the military. The power of checks and balances inherent in
the availability of deliberations is evident is these protocols, and should be
studied as a model for the Israeli decision-making process activating the
war-making powers.5
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THE COMPOSITION OF THE CABINET
On Sunday 28 October 1956, Israel’s cabinet held its regular weekly meeting.6 Ben-Gurion placed on the table a motion “to perform an action of
several raids” the following day.7 Israel’s coalition cabinet comprised 16
ministers: 9 from the leading Mapai party headed by Ben-Gurion; 2 representing each of the smaller parties—the National Religious Party (Mafdal),
the United Labor Party (Achdut Haavoda), and the Israel Workers Party
(Mapam); and one representative of the Progressive party, Minister of Justice Pinhas Rosen. Mapai members who participated in the deliberations
were Ministers Zalman Aranne (Education and Culture); Levi Eshkol
(Finance); Golda Meir (Foreign Affairs); Pinhas Sapir (Commerce and
Industry); and Bechor Shalom Shetreet (Police). Of these, Eshkol, Sapir,
and Meir constituted the small inner ring with whom Ben-Gurion shared
power.
The National Religious Party was represented by ministers Yosef Burg
(Postal Services), and Moshe Shapira (Religion and Welfare). The United
Labor Party was represented by ministers Moshe Carmel (Transportation),
and Israel Bar-Yehuda (Interior). These six, together with Pinhas Rosen,
supported the motion but expressed various degrees of skepticism about its
wisdom and effectiveness. Mapam, whose members opposed the motion,
was represented by ministers Mordechai Bentov (Development), and Israel
Barzilai, (Health).
Five months prior to these events the cabinet underwent a major
change. Minister of Foreign Affairs Moshe Sharett, a strong voice for multilateralism and diplomacy, was ousted and replaced by Golda Meir, a
staunch Ben-Gurion supporter, which tilted the pendulum in favor of
belligerency.8 The ministers below will be referred to by name.
The cabinet protocols contain 42 dense pages and appear to be a verbatim transcript of the deliberations. Of these, Ben-Gurion’s opening remarks
accounted for 10 pages. His response to the challenges and queries posed
by the ministers occupied another 6.5 pages. Altogether, his words account
for one-third of the entire protocol. The cabinet approved the motion, with
the dissention of the two Mapam members.
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THE MOTION: “A NUMBER OF R AIDS” OR A FULL
FLEDGED WAR: WHAT’S IN THE TERM? OR:
WHAT WAS THE CABINET VOTING FOR?
Ben-Gurion’s motion did not literally amount to a proposal to launch a war.
He used the term raid or raids to designate the military action on the table,
repeating it ten times during his presentation. In describing the anticipated
action by France and Britain he informed the cabinet that they will “bomb”
. . . Egyptian targets with the purpose of “toppling Nasser”; he later used
the term “action” to describe the anticipated attacks. Ben-Gurion reserved
the term “war” to describe what the enemy might do: “There is apprehension . . . that following this raid . . . Jordan or Syria or both will launch a
war against Israel.”9 Clearly, Ben-Gurion was choosing his terms carefully.
The previous week, at the secret Sèvres conference in Paris, where the
agreement between the allies was signed, the British explicitly stated that
without an Israeli “act of war” Britain would not have the formal reason it
absolutely needed in order to intervene as planned.10 Ben-Gurion understood the dangers lurking in defining the proposed action as war. Behind
the careful terminology lay the emerging body of international law—jus
ad bellum (justice to war).
These powerful yet still nascent doctrines explicitly prohibited wars
of aggression and strictly regulated decisions to launch wars.11 Israel was
a party to the UN charter, which outlawed war except for self-defense or
pursuant to UNSC (UN Security Council) approval.12 At Sèvres, BenGurion bitterly resented the fact that Israel was designated the role of “the
aggressor” by France and Britain (while they donned the cloak of using
military measures in order to restore peace), and that performing war as an
act of aggression (violating jus ad bellum) might result in serious international complications.13 His opening remarks were carefully crafted to avoid
an Israeli admission, even in the sheltered and secluded cabinet room, that
this was the plan.14 The ministers, however, were ready to engage. They
understood very well the linguistic (hence, legal) significance of choosing a
term, and forced Ben-Gurion to face the full thrust of his motion.
Barzilai opened the deliberations with a blistering critique. He immediately named the “elephant in the room”: on the table was a motion to go
to war. “This motion [is for] an ‘initiated war or initiated actions’.”15 “We
shall be the first to shoot. The first act of aggression will be ours”; he added
that, “we are launching an aggression,”16 “we are the aggressors.” Barzilai
bolstered his argument by contrasting the proposed motion with the 1948
War of Independence, a war of self-defense, with what it was now preparing
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for—a war of aggression. He used the term “war” twelve times in his four
and one-half page presentation. The question of the appropriate term for
the “motion” was thus on the table.
The remaining ministers wrestled with the problem. Following Barzilai, Bar-Yehuda began by rejecting the term “initiated war”, but continued
to emphasize that the cabinet was contemplating a war. Rosen followed
suit, conceding that “we clearly now want an initiated war.”17 Bentov
twice referred to the motion as a decision to launch a “preemptive war”.18
Levi Eshkol (P.M. during the 1967 war), supporting the motion, tried to
revert to the earlier terminology: “I suggest that in conversations and with
regard to the press to beware of the definition initiated war . . . this is an
act of self defense, we should have no doubt, this is the way it will enter
history.”19 Speaking after Eshkol, Meir picked up the hint. Addressing the
motion as a “proposed action”, she compared it to 1948. Towards the end
of the meeting, Ben-Gurion no longer repeated the euphemism of “raid”,
but cautioned care: “I shall not use the term preventive war. We should not
have such thoughts.”20
Clearly, the cabinet was well aware of the nature of the motion and
its grave international ramifications, and was willing to confront the harsh
reality. Even those who urged avoiding the terms initiated or preventive war
understood that it would likely be interpreted as such, and worried about
being labeled as aggressors. No one was fooled or blinded as they voted on
the motion.
THE STRUCTURE OF THE CABINET’S DELIBER ATIONS
Ben-Gurion opened with a well-structured presentation of the proposal.
Following his presentation, a group of skeptical ministers spoke. Two
squarely opposed the motion, while others reluctantly supported it—Barzilai poignantly expressed dissent while Bentov delivered his opposing arguments later. Between these two, other ministers offered grave reservations,
but did not oppose the motion.21
Ben-Gurion then launched a discussion (7 pages), interspersed with
interruptions from the skeptical group, offering rebutting arguments and
defending the motion. In contrast to his opening remarks, his response to
the skeptics appeared to be more candid, revealing his anxiety and deep
doubts. As shall be discussed later, he unmasked a crucial factor in this deal:
it was an offer he felt he could not and should not refuse. He could not
refuse the offer because of the three powers, Israel was the vulnerable agent,
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discreetly obliged to heed the desires of its senior partners; this was true
particularly with regard to the desire of France, Israel’s generous benefactor.
He should not refuse the offer because the expected fruit of success—an
overhaul of the international order in the Middle-East was too promising,
while the status quo appeared so grim. When Ben-Gurion concluded his
rebuttal the floor was taken by his loyal supporters who favored the motion.
Unlike the tough arguments presented by the skeptics, the loyalists offered
perfunctory arguments and were distinguished by what they did not say.
Even though (or because) this group was made of the top party echelon,
Israel’s major power holders, who understood what was at stake, they
limited themselves to platitudes and refrained from engaging the more
penetrating arguments made by the skeptics. In keeping with Ben-Gurion’s
admonition, the loyalists spoke very briefly, and the motion was approved.
Following approval, the two dissenters stated that they would remain in
the cabinet rather than resign, thereby sharing collective responsibility for
the war.22
CASUS BELLI: WHY WAR? WHY TOMORROW?
THE PRIME MINISTER SPEAKS
Ben-Gurion’s opening remarks (nearly a quarter of the entire protocols)
were structured and coherent. He began with a statement of the casus belli,
followed by a short report of the military plans of attack, the agreement
between Israel, France, and Britain, and finally his concerns. The list of
casus belli clearly reveals that Ben-Gurion was aware of international law
and implies that jus ad bellum mattered, and that felt obliged Israel to justify
the appearance of aggression with arguments of self-defense.
The five casus belli against Egypt all constituted violations of international law. First, Egypt had violated Section 1 of the armistice agreement
since its inception. Second, Egypt violated an explicit UNSC resolution of
1951 which held that “There is no state of war between Egypt and Israel.”
Third, even if a state of war prevailed, international law gave Israel the
right of freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal, which Egypt denied it.
Fourth, Egypt had organized a special guerilla force, the Fedayeen, and, in
collaboration with Jordan and Syria, had been responsible for terrorist raids
committed by this force into Israeli territory.23 Fifth, Egypt’s blockade of
the Straits of Tiran prevented free navigation of ships to the Israeli port of
Eilat, again in violation of international law. Ben-Gurion did not elaborate
on any of these casus belli. He did not explain how Egypt had violated the
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UNSC resolution nor distinguish between the offered reasons that did
constitute a valid ground for a war of self-defense (e.g., the organization of
the Fedayeen), and those which did not.
Ben-Gurion then stated the motion: “There is a proposal to launch a
few raids,24 the strategic purpose of which is to conquer the coastal strip
adjacent to the straits of Tiran [Aqaba].”25 He elaborated on the nature of
the straits and the military necessity of establishing control not only over
the Western coastal strip, but also of strategic points in the Sinai desert
itself. He described the Egyptian military presence in the Sinai, reminding
the cabinet that Jordan and Syria were in the process of entering into an
agreement to unify their military commands under Egyptian leadership.
He then linked the casus belli to the motion on the table:
The proposal is—for the violations of the armistice agreements, for violations of international law, for operating the Fedayeen recently and [for] the
blockade in the Suez and in the Straits of Eilat we shall conduct a raid tomorrow, the purpose of which is to reach and control the entire coastal strip of
the straits, including the two small islands that do not have much value but
particularly the island of Tiran.26

The island, he continued, was historically under Jewish sovereignty (in
the 6th century ce), but, this was not the basis for the motion, which, he
repeated, was to conduct the “raid tomorrow”.27
He then presented the tripartite agreement between Israel, France,
and Britain:
On Tuesday the governments of Britain and France will address Israel and
Egypt and make two pleas: a) to cease the hostilities; b) to refrain from entering the areas of 10 miles from both sides of the Canal, and c) to allow British
and French forces to occupy key positions along the Canal. And they will
request an answer within 12 hours.28

He disclosed the content of the Sèvres agreement: on Wednesday morning
Britain and France would bomb Egyptian air fields and occupy key positions in the Canal. Furthermore, Egypt’s President, Gamal Abdel Nasser,
would be overthrown.29
Ben-Gurion discussed the plans’ ramifications for Israel: France was
explicitly committed to supply air cover for Israel’s back; Britain agreed in
writing not to activate its defense treaty with Jordan if that country used
the opportunity to attack Israel; and the British commitment gave Israel a
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free hand to “do whatever we want to do”.30 Addressing the allies’ commitment he stated that he had “no doubts about the sincerity and loyalty” of
the French; although he was skeptical about Britain, during the last week
he came to trust their commitment to the deal.31
Ben-Gurion arrived at the fourth part of the presentation: the pros and
cons of the proposed war: “It is possible that we shall encounter problems
with the Egyptian army in the Sinai. We may also face hostilities with
Jordan and Syria and Iraq.” Nevertheless he urged the cabinet to consider
the upside:
This is a unique historical opportunity that may never return. Indeed, it is
impossible to predict, but in the current international constellation there may
not be another situation where two big powers, not as big as America and
Russia, but big European powers, take it upon themselves to liquidate Nasser
and they can do it and we shall not be partners to this.32

After an interruption33 Ben-Gurion proceeded to emphasize the
danger posed by Nasser, thereby amplifying the value of the proposed
regime change: Egypt with a population of 22 million and the charismatic
Nasser rapidly spreading his influence across the Arab world would sooner
or later attack Israel, and while this attack would end in Israeli victory, it
would also be very costly. Joining the allies now would rid Israel of this
powerful enemy at relatively little cost.34 He also upped the menace: “Not
only the entire Arab world will assist Nasser, but also someone outside the
Arab world.”35
Ben-Gurion addressed the two superpowers. According to the allies,
the U.S. was not likely to get involved six days before the presidential
elections, especially when two of its Western allies were involved. He
then opined that the USSR would remain neutral if the U.S. did not
intervene, but added, “Again I say: I do not guarantee this.” Complications in Eastern Europe might also deter Russian intervention. However,
he cautioned, “Russia has enough power to suppress Hungary . . . and to
interfere here.”36
He reached the need to abide by the rules of parliamentary democracy.
Like Britain and France, Israel needed a formal cabinet ratification before
action could be taken: “I told them that the cabinet meeting is on Sunday
morning and only then shall we be able to announce our decision.”37 Why
tomorrow as opposed to next week or next year?38 Ben-Gurion said not a
word about this matter in his introductory remarks; it was only clarified
when he re-took the floor to rebut the skeptics.39
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THE CABINET DELIBER ATES
The cabinet deliberations were intense. The skeptical group, both supporters and dissenters, neither adopted the euphemism of “raid” nor were
swayed by Ben-Gurion’s list of casus belli.40 The loyalist group offered tepid
arguments in favor of the motion. It appeared that even they shared the
foreboding expressed by the skeptics and dissenters.
The cabinet addressed and evaluated six issues related to the impending
war: first, the meaning of the tripartite agreement; second, the list of casus
belli; third, foreseeable international complications, primarily the reactions of the superpowers; fourth, the philosophy of war and peace; fifth,
the likelihood of regime change in Egypt; and, sixth, the preparedness of
the home front. The following analysis will weave Ben-Gurion’s rebuttal
into the arguments made by the ministers, but in the original protocols the
entire rebuttal followed the arguments made by the skeptics.
THE TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT
As Ben-Gurion conceded in his answer to Barzilai’s question, but for the
allies’ intervention he would not have entertained the idea of launching war
“tomorrow”.41 While Ben-Gurion presented the agreement as a unique historical opportunity to improve Israel’s position, Barzilai, speaking right after
Ben-Gurion, presented a different appraisal. Talking from the standpoint
of hardnosed realism, he warned of any delusions of friendship. Friendship
and international relations did not sit well with each other.
Britain and France were cynically using Israel, and might not hesitate to drop it in the cold if their interests so dictated. Therefore, Barzilai
warned, it would be reckless for Israel to go along: “For a long time England and France have not dared be the first to start [the war], because they
do not want to invite American pressure, they do not want to appear as
aggressors before the U.N., what do they do—push us to do it.”42 Barzilai
was alluding to the possibility that international developments, particularly
U.S. intervention, might lead to a partial satisfaction of Britain and France’s
interests, and that the two might thereby agree to end the hostilities and
ignore Israel’s interests.
Other ministers also worried about a possible deal between Britain,
France, and Egypt, and raised the specter of perfidious Albion once again
betraying Israel’s cause.43 Only Rosen saw the British involvement as a
factor in favor of war: “I am doing this (voting yes), because I . . . see this
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as a shift to a new policy not only regarding France . . . but with regard to
Britain.”44 He confessed that he too suspected British sincerity, yet he came
to believe that Sèvres represented a turning point in British foreign policy.
The reason for his enthusiasm, Rosen made clear, was the sense of relief
rooted in the knowledge that Israel was not walking alone.
Unlike Rosen, Carmel rejected the alliance, but approved the war.
Like Ben-Gurion, and unlike Barzilai, he thought that war was inevitable
because the siege imposed upon Israel by the Arab countries was intolerable. Like Barzilai, he insisted on tough realism. War should be fought
only for the purpose of advancing Israel’s interests, not to do the bids of
other nations, however friendly they may be. For Carmel, the friendship of
foreign powers was not a good enough reason to make war, and he warned
that it might even boomerang because international public opinion may
come to identify Israel as doing the dirty work for the British.45 Israeli
independence of action, he emphasized, was crucial.
The second dissenter, Bentov, was also underwhelmed by the allure of
friendship. For him, the devil was in the details. He posed a sharp question: an appeal (ultimatum, termed “appeal” out of deference to Israel as
a partner) by Britain and France to Israel and Egypt to cease fire ten miles
from the canal implied an Israeli plan to reach the Canal. However, BenGurion just stated that Israel was not headed to the Suez Canal and was
only interested in the Gulf of Aqaba. The appeal therefore was a sham, and
would only [and in hindsight, indeed did, PL] expose the collusion between
the three parties.46 Bentov wanted to know why they should agree to this
transparent scheme.
The loyalists, endorsing the tripartite agreement, avoided realpolitik.
For them the crucial point was that, after eight years of isolated existence,
Israel was in the company of respectable (European) friends. They urged
the cabinet to view the agreement as firm and to appreciate the benefits
of a move that would improve Israel’s international status by creating the
coveted new Middle East world order. Eshkol referred to the agreement as
“a complete revolution, a change from one extreme to the other.”47 Meir
amplified the point: “I am standing in awe; I cannot fathom what happened there, that suddenly we the meek, the small and humble became a
focal point” and she added that while she “trusted France it was almost an
obligation (‘a mitzvah’) to suspect Britain.” She also sought to comfort the
cabinet with a cold calculation—Britain would keep its word because it
“cannot betray us without betraying France”.48 Aranne echoed her description of Israel as the weak party: “If we were strong we would not need the
alliance, but we are weak.” He also suggested that Barzilai’s realism—the
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suggestion that the allies were using Israel to provide a pretext to go to war,
should be turned upside down: Israel was the one using the allies in order
to promote its own interests. The allies’ attack in the Suez Canal would
cause an upheaval, which in turn would divert attention away from Israel’s
“raids” and thereby provide it with cover. (“Just so”, Ben-Gurion interrupted, confirming the point). Aranne also recommended trust in Britain:
PM Eden’s “personal prestige is hanging on the Suez matter” and therefore
it is unlikely that he will not follow through.49
Sapir rhapsodized about the relief of associating with such fine company: “This is a historical opportunity that these mighty wish to go along
with us.” He reminisced about the dearth of weapons during the war
of independence compared to the bounty of weapons now supplied by
France.50 His argument may have been a veiled hint at the fact that the
cabinet was approving a cold transaction: France was supplying arms and,
as a quid pro quo, Israel was providing a pretext to launch a war. The cautious Sapir did not offer unequivocal support. He confessed that he had
“doubts” and was aware of the dangers. There was “anxiety . . . hidden in
the heart” that the allies might not fulfill their commitment and attack
on Wednesday.51 He echoed other practical cabinet members who had
difficulty believing that Britain had changed its position overnight.
The cabinet was hard-headed in its appraisal of the Sèvres agreement.
Almost all ministers understood its overt blessing and its hidden curse. The
repetition of the sense of relief at having the ring of isolation broken, the
delight at being recognized as a worthy partner, reveal the anxiety of Israel’s
elite in the mid-fifties. Isolation was wearing the leadership down, and the
cabinet welcomed the newfound goodwill; nevertheless, all understood that
underneath the comforting camaraderie lurked the cruel reality of international bargains. First, the newfound British friendship may be short-lived
and, second, nothing came for free. The condition required to be accepted
into the halls of the strong and mighty, was to accept the role of aggressor.
This dark side of the bargain was highlighted in Ben-Gurion’s rebuttal,
which on one hand denied the existence of a simple contract—France gave
Israel weapons “without political conditions”;52 while on the other hand,
“the initiative (to go to war) did not come from us. If it did not come from
there [the allies, PL], it would not have come from me, because I wanted
to get more arms.”53 He conceded that there was an unarticulated expectation that Israel would abide by France’s desire to go to war in order to
guarantee the flow of arms. That the negotiations were not among equal
partners, and that Israel, the dependent partner, had limited bargaining
power, became even clearer when Ben-Gurion explained the choice of the
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date for the invasion (the next day), an explanation he failed to offer during
his opening remarks. Five times in the space of two pages he repeated that
“We did not decide upon the date”, that “The date was chosen by them”,
and Israel could only say “yes or no”.54 From Israel’s perspective, he said,
waiting another six months would have been preferable, but the matter was
not in Israel’s hands. “They are not in my pocket”, he said, again referring
to Israel’s weakness at the bargaining table.55
Commenting on the issue of friendship, Ben-Gurion observed that
Israel stood to gain an enormous amount. Nasser would be overthrown
(of which he was certain) by the military forces of the two friends, without
“one Jew’s falling in battle”.56 Therefore, “Isn’t it nice that we perform an act
the night before that is unconnected with their action . . . they will use it
as a pretext to issue an ultimatum to Nasser.”57 No one should blame BenGurion for thinking that this was about “being nice”. Rather, he offered a
hard-headed analysis: the tripartite agreement required that Israel appear
as an aggressor before the international community, and that may be a
“disaster”; yet at the same time Nasser could be destroyed. On balance, the
foreseen gain justified the pain.
THE LIST OF CASUS BELLI
Of the five causes justifying a war listed by Ben-Gurion, the denial of
freedom of navigation through the Gulf of Aqaba was the one that most
of the ministers dwelled upon. By implication, they opined that the four
other causes failed to qualify as valid reasons to start a war at that time. The
guarantee of freedom of navigation to and from the port of Eilat, marginal
from the perspective of Britain and France, proved to be the most enduring
and powerful achievement of Israel in the 1956 war.58
Ministers understood that the blockade needed more in order to qualify as a casus bellum. An actual act of aggression on the part of Egypt was
needed in order to ripen the blockade into a right of self-defense. They
called it a reason or ground (in Hebrew “Eela”): Israel should have tried to
send a ship through the straits. Only when Egypt activated the blockade
and prevented passage would Israel’s right of self defense spring to life. The
term “reason” or “ground” was used in two separate contexts throughout the
deliberations. The allies demanded that Israel go to war, thereby supplying
them with a reason to intervene without appearing as aggressors. Besides
supplying a ground of action to others, Israel itself needed a reason to start
a war and show that it was not in flagrant violation of international law. In
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addition to resenting the need to supply the allies with a ground for action,
with a keen awareness of international law, some ministers were worried
about the absence of a justification that might absolve Israel of the charge
of aggression. Like Ben-Gurion, the ministers were sensitive to the ways jus
ad bellum applied to the case at hand.
Ben-Gurion had already introduced the issue in his initial presentation, but he was referring to navigation through the canal, not the Straits of
Tiran, proving perhaps that the canal was the focus of the war, as required
by Britain and France: “There was a suggestion that maybe we should try
to send a ship through the Suez Canal and they (the Egyptians) will deny
it passage. This would be a reason to conduct the raid.” A consultation
with Carmel, made clear that there was no time to execute the plan and it
was shelved.59
The ministers made various suggestions for an appropriate “reason”
to launch a war, thereby implying that Ben-Gurion’s five causes were not
persuasive. Shapira, fearing that Israel might be portrayed as an aggressor, suggested that Israel use the recent establishment of a Unified Arab
Command under Egyptian leadership as casus bellum. “We should file a
complaint in the Security Council, claiming that the unified command
amounted to a declaration of war. That way we shall be justified in taking
action.”60 Bentov rejected this idea, and re-emphasized the Aqaba blockade
as the only plausible ground to launch war: “We need to do the maximum
to give the world the impression that this is the reason for the war.” He
emphasized his frustration at the fact that the Ministry of Transportation failed to arrange for “a ship [that] will break through the blockade
and that they will detain it, that they will shoot at it.”61 At the end of the
debate, Eshkol picked up on Bentov’s idea, but challenged the argument
that it would have provided a superior justification: “They [the Egyptians]
could have let the ship pass, and thereby preempt the reason [to launch a
war].”62 Eshkol’s argument was pragmatic and impatient of technicalities.
A “reason” was a cover-up, and not a true cause. Because it was likely to
fail it was useless. The appearance of legality was not material. For Eshkol,
a staunch Ben-Gurion loyalist, the justification to go to war was rooted in
the “opportunity” the war provided for improving Israel’s circumstances.
This was both the true and the sufficient reason.63
Overall, it seems that the casus belli were not perceived by the cabinet
as persuasive or even necessary. There seemed to be a tacit understanding
that Israel was going to war in order to abide by the tripartite agreement.
Ministers also understood the significance of jus ad bellum, and most hoped
a way could be found to present Israel as adhering to the emerging norms
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of the law of war. At the same time, they were swayed by the benefits a
successful war might produce for Israel: regime change in Egypt, defeat of
the Egyptian army in Sinai, acquisition of territory along the coastal strip
of the Gulf of Aqaba which would guarantee free navigation to Eilat, and
alliance with the European powers, kindling hopes of acting as “almost”
equal partners in engineering a new Middle East order.
INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS
Barzilai, taking the floor after Ben-Gurion, interpreted the tripartite agreement in the context of the broader international scene. Why did Britain
and France need Israel? Because they worried about U.S. pressure and
looked for a scapegoat. He warned about the U.S. reaction to the invasion,
and dismissed as mere speculation Ben-Gurion’s assessment that the Presidential election campaign would distract the U.S. Barzilai predicted that
U.S. pressure could yet undo any future military gains opining [correctly,
in hindsight] that it would use the invasion to augment its international
role as a “champion of peace”, and make “decisive political moves” against
Israel.64 U.S. pressure on the European parties could leave Israel in precisely
the situation it dreaded: alone in the battlefield. Even France, considered
by Ben-Gurion as Israel’s true friend, may change course if the U.S. could
persuade Nasser to terminate his interventions in Algeria.65
Barzilai focused on the USSR. The complications in Hungary and
Poland were not so great as to rule out Soviet intervention [also correct in
hindsight]. The USSR had enough resources to intervene both in Eastern
Europe and in the Middle East. An invasion of the Sinai may even give
the Soviets the excuse they needed to gain influence in the Middle East.66
He added that the Bandung group of Asian and African nations, which
recently opposed colonialism and imperialism, would react with hostility
against Israel.67 Bentov also called attention to the U.S.: “After the elections, the U.S. may, together with other powers, insist that we withdraw,
this danger is real.”68
Ben-Gurion admitted that he too was worried:
Most of all I am worried about America. America will force us to withdraw.
America does not need to send military forces. America can say that she is
breaking diplomatic relations, stopping Israeli fund raising, loan guarantees,
and more, she will consider what’s more important to her—we or the Arabs,
that we shall be in her camp or that she will be against us.
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He could not predict how Eisenhower, if elected for a second term (very
likely at that point) would react.69 This analysis, almost an accurate forecast of future events, is astonishing. Ben-Gurion and the cabinet had a
very good grasp of the international scene; they were fully aware of the
risks, and yet decided to go forward. The proof that the U.S. factor was
well understood, and only obscured for fear that it would tilt the scale in
favor of prudence, is found in the analysis of the loyalists, whose discussion
followed Ben-Gurion’s rebuttal. Neither Eshkol, nor Meir, both practical
leaders intimately familiar with the extent of Israel’s dependence on the
U.S., mentioned the superpower. Instead, they emphasized the extraordinary fortunes that would befall Israel should the “opportunity” materialize
into gains. While silent about the U.S., they did discuss the dangers posed
by the USSR, as if attention to the USSR would spare deliberation about
the U.S. It may well be that the loyalists accepted the inevitability of “war
tomorrow”, and therefore concentrated on the promise of the expected
gains. However, it is important to realize that Ben-Gurion disclosed his
astute estimate of what was to come and that the cabinet understood the
risks taken.
Meir, whose cabinet role should have required analysis of the international scene, and who was savvy about international affairs, defended
the plan in generalities, “the world” would condemn Israel, but “we shall
overcome”. To justify the war, and strengthen the cabinet in expectation
of world condemnation, she revived the narrative of the 1948 war. Then, as
now, Israel had been fighting for survival and had no choice but to weather
the storm:
I am not ashamed for this to be recorded in the protocol, that if I have to
choose between these two things [death or survival, PL], I am willing to
receive a condemnation even from the UN, even from . . . all the heads of
states, the decent and the indecent and stay alive.70

She understood the impending international outcry and implicitly urged
the cabinet to accept it with no feelings of guilt.
Sapir further diverted attention away from the U.S. to the USSR: “I
see the greatest danger in a covert Russian intervention against us. Russia
will experience Nasser’s defeat as its own” He added that one could not tell
how the political chaos in Jordan or the unrest in Syria might affect the
situation.71 Despite his fears he supported the war. The tactical reasoning by
the group of loyalists—all well acquainted with the significance of the U.S.
for Israel’s survival—is an indication of the dynamics of decision making
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in the cabinet. Whether determined to suppress the reality in order to calm
their own fears, or aware that the opportunity for reversal was not on the
table, the loyalists seemed either to have placed support of the prime minister above their keen understanding of Israel’s interests, or to have trusted
their leader to know better.
A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE:
WHEN SHOULD THE NATION GO TO WAR?
Barzilai first introduced the point: “I must return to . . . principles, you
[Ben-Gurion] have explained it best . . .: a shaky peace is always better
and preferred to victory in war, not to war, but to a victory in war”. War
meant loss of life and limb, the sacrifice of “an entire young generation” (as
experienced in the war of independence, PL) with no guarantee of peace. A
“third round” between Israel and its neighbors was foreseeable, even if this
war ended in victory. Barzilai reminded Ben-Gurion that he himself had
theorized that only a political solution, not a war, could resolve the Arab
Israeli conflict, and that in the past he (Ben-Gurion) pledged that Israel
“shall never start a war.”72
Barzilai asked Ben-Gurion to account for the theory of war and peace
that he had previously elaborated upon,73 that war was linked to death, that
a government was bearing the awesome responsibility to preserve the life
of the young generation.74 He later referred to Ben-Gurion’s assertion that
this war would be short: “Who guarantees that there will not be a conflagration . . . even if the chance is small, are we allowed to take the risk?”75
Better keep the shaky peace, he concluded.76 His insights struck a chord
and ignited a lively debate.
An interesting aspect of the debate was how Barzilai’s words were
twisted. Whereas he stated that “a shaky peace” was better than war, BarYehuda changed the term to “bad peace”, stating that he would not necessarily prefer a bad peace to a war.77 On his mind was the Jewish experience
in WW II. The bad peace with Nazi Germany “only secured our destruction”.78 Hence, choosing between war and peace was not a matter of principle but rather contingent upon context. Yet Bar-Yehuda refrained from
analyzing the pending circumstances. The matter was already decided: “We
are not asked to decide prospectively but rather retroactively.”79
The cabinet addressed the desirability of a “bad peace over war”—rather
than “a shaky peace compared to war”. Barzilai, perhaps realizing he was outnumbered, or losing perspective of the difference in the heat of the debate,
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did not correct his fellow ministers. Carmel picked up the theme. “I agree
with the formula that a bad peace is better than victory”, but he pointed
to exceptions. A bad peace may lead to war under worse circumstances. He
opined that war in the near future was inevitable because the “belt around
us is tightening so that the danger for the destruction of the state increases
daily.” Therefore, it was preferable to launch a war now when the circumstances were more favorable. As to victory, Carmel argued that a military
victory was always better than defeat.80 The task at hand was to prevent
further changes in the status quo. The Arab countries were tightening the
siege around Israel and time was on their side. It was better to strike now.
Bentov rejected this view and reintroduced the principle that only political
solutions were stable: “In general I do not believe that a small nation can
resolve any problem through war. Every problem resolved will yield graver
problems.” Ben-Gurion interrupted, and the following exchange took place:
“One problem, God forbid, may be resolved to destroy us”—Bentov, “So it
will resolve the problem of the other side”—Ben-Gurion, “We need to make
sure there will be no such war”—Bentov, “This is a long term problem. We
are now speaking about short term problems.”
The gist of the disagreement between the two was survival. Ben-Gurion
saw every war, even one initiated by Israel, as involving Israel’s survival.
Bentov urged a distinction between different kinds of war, and saw the
proposed war as related not to survival but rather to benefits that may or
may not materialize. Ben-Gurion agreed that, “We know how we start, but
there is no guarantee how it will end.”81 He admitted that the territorial
gains he discussed in his opening remarks might not materialize. He now
offered a different benefit: the war might bring about a quiet period of
five to eight years that would enable Israel to invest in domestic building:
“When I weigh on the one hand the chances of constructive work, and on
the other hand the possibility of struggle and war, then the quiet work is
decisive.” He predicted that Nasser’s overthrow would grant Israel a period
of “passive peace”, a welcome development.82 Eshkol and Meir returned
to the notion of a “bad peace”. “We are increasingly under siege”, Eshkol
echoed Carmel’s point, and this could only end in a “bad peace”. He did
not see a partner with whom to strike a “bad peace” deal. Egypt was planning to attack Israel, i.e., it had no interest in maintaining the conditions
of a “bad peace”.83 Meir reiterated Eshkol’s point calling the “bad peace” an
“unguaranteed luxury”. The Arab countries would destroy the “bad peace”
at the appropriate moment.
The cabinet deliberations veered between the general and the particular. The skeptical ministers emphasized the matter of principle—war
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was risky, unpredictable surprises and complications might arise. Unless
absolutely necessary, it was preferable to keep the status quo. Even a military
victory, they emphasized, might not yield the desired political solution.
Ben-Gurion’s loyalists emphasized the logic of preemptive war: a bad peace
gives the enemy time to prepare for war. Ben-Gurion was in the middle,
conceding the validity of the principle, but pushing for an exception to
the rule because this war presented an “opportunity” to improve Israel’s
strategic situation. The meaning of a “shaky peace”, with its implication
that perhaps diplomacy could lead to a political solution, was frozen in the
icy realization that war was inevitable. In a collective act of “reducing dissonance”, the cabinet dismissed the faint promise of diplomacy and adopted
the pessimism inherent in the reality of war.
LIKELIHOOD OF REGIME CHANGE
Ben-Gurion made it clear that overthrowing Nasser was enormously important and tempting.84 None of the ministers in the ensuing deliberations
doubted the dangers inherent in Nasser’s leadership or the legitimacy of
perpetrating a regime change by external force. Some doubted the likelihood of regime change or expressed fears about the aftermath of such an
overthrow, even if it came to pass. Barzilai argued that “It may well be that
Nasser will depart”; from his place in exile he “may also establish a shadow
government, he may launch an unending guerrilla war.” Who could tell
what policy “his replacement will choose”. Egypt’s next ruler may decide
to appease the West by displaying cooperation on the Suez Canal issue or
even on Algeria. While doing so, this next ruler may adopt a harsh position
against Israel (Barzilai referred to an anti-Semitic policy thereby equating
an anti-Israel position with anti-Semitism). Under these circumstances the
appeased West may turn its back to Israel.85
Ben-Gurion ignored Barzilai’s warnings. He twice expressed his “trust”
that Britain and France were determined to remove Nasser, and that they
had the military power to do so. But he cautioned not to see regime change
as a fait accomplis: “A different government may emerge in Egypt, I do not
know, I do not give this as part of the dowry, nobody can tell what will
happen there.”86 The matter was not extensively deliberated even though it
was a major aim of the proposed war. It may well be that the ministers had
too much trust in the “mighty” European powers, and could not fathom
that the task would not be accomplished. It could also be that wishful
thinking took hold of them, helping turn a blind eye to Barzilai’s warnings
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and Ben-Gurion’s concession. The cabinet could not ponder alternative
scenarios to the rosy one presented by Ben-Gurion.
THE PREPAREDNESS OF THE HOMEFRONT
In his initial presentation, Ben-Gurion mentioned that Israel lacked adequate protection against a possible Egyptian air attack, and that France
had committed its air force to protect the rear should an attack take place.
Barzilai and Bar-Yehuda both protested that the homefront was not adequately protected because there were not enough shelters and hospitals.
Ben-Gurion urged the cabinet not to address the matter “now” and the
matter indeed was dropped until after the vote.
CONCLUSION
This article is one part of an ongoing research project. The emphasis on
small in the title—a small nation goes to war—should now stand out as an
important aspect of the decision-making process. In the second half of the
twentieth century the place a country occupied in the larger international
scene made a difference. The protocols leading to the fateful decision to
go to war reveal a sober and earnest process of deliberation, where much
of the information was placed on the table, and where deep and searching
arguments were considered. The vulnerability of Israel on the international
scene appears to have served as the ultimate push to authorize the invasion.
Israel emerged with a few gains from the 1956 war that were not foreseen by either Ben-Gurion or the cabinet. The gains should be attributed
to Ben-Gurion’s ability to change course in light of the United States’
fierce disapproval, and to the fine diplomatic campaign led by Meir and
Eban, a campaign that galvanized U.S. public opinion in support of the
small and vulnerable Jewish State. It may well be that without diplomacy,
international ire might have seriously traumatized the fledgling polity.
It is important to consider not only what was said, but also what was
omitted. Two important issues were not mentioned. First, the fact that at
the end of the Sèvres meeting the French promised Israel a big reward—
assistance in building a peaceful nuclear plant in the Negev. Ben-Gurion did
not report this to the cabinet. Second, the entire protocols do not mention
the Egyptian Jewish community. The Jewish state, looking backward at
the horrific catastrophe of the Holocaust and forward to building a strong,
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defensible Israel, did not pause to consider the fate of Egyptian Jews. They
were expelled by Nasser shortly after the invasion and thereby came an end
to the Jewish community in Egypt.

Notes
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